Everything under the Heavens: How the Past Helps Shape China’s Push for Global Power, Howard W. French, 2018
-there will come a tome, soon, when China will be able to keep the US in check, but not yet.
-China wishes to get back to the time when it could subjugate all other nations, to treat all foreign powers alike, but inferior to China
-US will only be able to yield a little to China, slowing down China to achieve just short of maximum goal
-China’s neighbours Japan, India, Vietnam, Phillipines, will band together for protection and as a counter-force to China
-China’s frenetic progress may be because China believe the cycle will change and may never return, China has self-doubt
-Can China avoid the “middle income trap”
-military: China has copied US tech, but this will become more expensive and slower as their skill level increases
-China advances militarily in security, infrastructure and tech dev, but lags domestically
-China’s mfg capability strong, but basic scientific, tech capacity and innovative tech weak, no multi-national companies
-China opts for navy and maritime expansion, but lacks navy. Also lacks defense pacts with other countries
-denial strategy: China denies the US from using SCSs but cannot exploit this area as well
-US cannot contain China but can increase China’s costs by partnering with neighbouring countries, upgrade military cooperation, use neighbouring countries as a web to contain China. Together they can do better than alone
-China’s demographics explains its speed: will grow old before grow prosperous
-China’s growth rates beginning to decline, before Xi’s 10yr period
-strong growth by overdependence on investments and debt -> long period of adjustment to low growth
-B&R countries too small, cannot absorb total steel production that exceeds world production, needs internal reforms
-China cannot escape demographics, will have highest elderly pop with the lowest working pop
-One Child policy changes doesn’t matter, old people already in China
-birth rate already too low, lower than replacement rate
-old age pensioners peak when there is massive contraction
-can compensate by increase in productivity, but china will increase in services sector, which has a lower productivity than mfg -> middle income trap
-cannot extrapolate straight-line growth
-by 2020 pay for health and pension costs of elderly, or go for growth? China has 10-12 years, peak in 2025
-China has no allies, while the US has a support system of nations
-China operates in low trust environment, abroad appeals to prosperity only, wealth above all does not bring respect